From the Self-Luminous Self to Pratyabhijñā: Śakti, Concealment and Recognition

The  term 'Pratyabhijna' means  recognition.In the Kasmirian Saivite thought system, it comprehends the sense of awareness, consciousness, realization, 'knowledge in practice' or practical use of knowledge. Pratyabhijna school thinks that man is ignorant (unaware) of the very nature of one's own Self (Shiva-Atman), viz. his inner being, the profounder faculty within him, and its power of 'Iccha' (Will), 'Jnana' (knowledge) and 'Kriya' (Action), According to Acharya Abhinavagupta, Pratyabhijna is the soteriological way of realisation and reasoning in which there is no methods(anupaya) and “this method-less method” is the highest of all (tato pi paraṃam jñānam upāyādi-vivarjitam..anuttara . Utpaladeva in his Īśvarapratyabhijñā-Kārikā  speaks of an important Śakti of ultimate consciousness(Para samvit) ,Svātantrya, or the sovereignty of will, which is connected with Maheśvaratva. Along with the powers of cognition and action, this sovereignty of will is an important characteristic of the ultimate Self. The powers of cognition and action are present in both the jaḍa and ajaḍa forms of manifestation. The one who truly knows and acts is therefore not merely a passive witness, but possesses both jñāna and kriyā.

Here a fundamental question arises. If the Ātman is self-luminous, and Maheśvara is the primordial existence and the Ultimate Being, possessing sarvakartṛtva(omni potent) and sarvajñatva(omniscient), then when does Pratyabhijñā take place? When does recognition or sākṣātkāra happen?

For recognition to take place, there should apparently be something to be realised and someone who realises it. This is how the problem appears from the ordinary understanding of knowledge. But if the Self is already self-luminous and complete in itself, then what is there to recognise?

Utpaladeva's response, as I understand it, begins with the fact that the Self is indeed self-luminous, but is somehow forgotten. If the Self is forgotten, there should either be a primordial action and will to hide itself, or there should be a second external agency that deludes Śiva. But if there is a second agency, the absolute sovereignty of Śiva itself would become questionable.

Therefore, the power of concealment has to be understood through Śakti itself. It is Śakti as will and action, operating through its own deluding power, Māyā-vimohinī Śakti. When the Self reveals itself, or becomes revealed, this takes place through its perceiving and acting power, through Kriyātmaka Śakti. What is concealed in Māyā remains hidden from awareness according to its innate condition.

When this concealed power is viewed as something separate from Śiva, it appears as an external power. But if the Self itself has concealed itself, then the same self-related Icchā-Śakti shines as Śivātmikā. This Tirodhāna or Tiraskaraṇī Śakti appears distinct from Śiva and yet performs the concealment through Śiva himself. Thus Śakti operates simultaneously as the external and internal power of Śiva.

This relationship between Śiva and Śakti can be understood through Śiva–Śakti sāmarasya, functioning both as vyaṣṭi and samaṣṭi. The very movement between bheda and abheda raises the question of recognition.

I ask something that appears different from me.

But if I, as Pūrṇāhaṃtā, am complete in myself, what else is there to ask, and why should I ask? The complete is complete in itself. It rests in itself. Śakti reposes in Śiva.

If there is something to ask, then there must be a relationship between subject and object: between absolute singularity, the pramātṛ, the perceiver, and plurality, consisting of mental, physical, cognitive and phenomenal projections and experiences.

Here Śakti simultaneously conceals and reveals Śiva. This process cannot be completely conceptualised through ordinary categories of time, human imagination, buddhi, manas or the senses. Concealment and revelation operate together. The power of saṅkalpa is limited within time and space, and therefore whatever is to be known remains concealed within that limitation.

This brings another question from the pūrvapakṣa. In living beings there is not merely ajaḍa; there is the power to see, perceive and know. How, then, can jaḍa exist?

Utpaladeva's response, as I understand it, is that because ajaḍa exists, jaḍa also exists.

Just imagine a world in which there are only moving things. Cognitively, how could we even apprehend or speculate about the idea of jaḍa? There is moving and non-moving. There should be something non-moving in order to apprehend the moving within the limitations of Māyā, time and space. Moving is understood in relation to non-moving, and non-moving in relation to moving.

But in a stream of consciousness that has no beginning or end, nothingness and allness can be revealed simultaneously. If there were complete nothingness, then, in order to recognise that nothingness as nothingness, there should already be some previous experience of allness. Recognition itself therefore presupposes a relation between what appears to be present and what has been experienced or apprehended.

In the same way, ajaḍatva contains jaḍatva, and jaḍatva contains ajaḍatva.

Sentient and insentient therefore appear as mutually complementary. Their existence and non-existence cannot simply be separated from one another. The distinction itself requires cognition. The sentient recognises the insentient, while the insentient becomes meaningful through the cognition of the sentient.

Thus the question of Pratyabhijñā is not merely about recognising an object that was previously unknown. It raises a deeper question about the very relationship between the knower and the known, between singularity and plurality, between concealment and revelation.

If the Self is already self-luminous and complete, then the central question remains:

What exactly is being recognised in Pratyabhijñā?

Is it something newly acquired, or is it that which was always present but remained concealed from awareness?

This question, emerging from the relationship between Śiva, Śakti, cognition, concealment and revelation, becomes the starting point for understanding the deeper problem of recognition in Pratyabhijñā philosophy

References:

1)    Kaw, R. K. (1967). The Doctrine of Recognition: (Pratyabhijñā Philosophy): A Study of Its Origin and Development and Place in Indian and Western Systems of Philosophy. Hoshiarpur: Vishveshvaranand Institute. (Series: Vishveshvaranand Indological Series, no. 40

2)    Ratié, Isabelle. "Otherness in the Pratyabhijñā Philosophy." Journal of Indian Philosophy, vol. 35, no. 4, Aug. 2007, pp. 313–70. SpringerLink